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Abstract 
In order to curb emissions and resulting environmental problems caused by the rapidly 
growing energy use of its building sector, China has implemented a number of policy 
instruments to promote Green Building practices, including market-based instruments for 
energy efficiency in buildings. This thesis aims to evaluate the economic efficiency of these 
policy measures, using the Four-High Award of Shanghai and its application and impact on 
the Chenghuaxinyuan housing scheme as a case study.  
A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was performed on the case to assess its economic efficiency 
from society’s perspective, complemented by a cost-revenue analysis from the residents’ and 
the developers’ perspective, respectively. Conservative estimates were used for all variables. 
All three analyses were subjected to sensitivity analyses. Data was collected from peer-
reviewed literature, and interviews conducted with building market stakeholders in Shanghai. 
Results suggest that the Green Building policy measures as such are not economically efficient: 
costs outweigh benefits. Higher electricity prices combined with tougher energy standards 
could change this. However, the price premium represents an added value for which some 
customers are willing to pay, which explains why the project was realised, and why it is in fact 
benefial to society as well as developer: the residents pay many times over for the developer’s 
incremental investment, which in turn generates socio-environmental benefits to society.  
To residents, the incremental investment for living in a Green Building does not pay off in 
pure economic terms. Environmental and status regards appear more important than price to 
customers in this market segment. To the developer, however, results suggest that Green 
Buildings are very profitable, thanks to the vast price premium paid by customers. 
Interviews indicate that financial policy incentives are only a minor driver behind developers’ 
Green Building decisions. Good relations to government, and branding, are the two critical 
aspects driving Green Building in Shanghai. 
 
Keywords: Economic Efficiency, Green Building Policy, Market-based policy instruments, 
China 
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Executive Summary 
China’s steadily increasing greenhouse gas emissions are intimately linked with the growing 
energy need of the Chinese economy. While national energy use grew from 47 exajoules in 
2002 to 90 exajoules in 2009, annual CO2 emissions grew from 1454.65 Mtons in 1980 to 
7706.83 Mtons in 2009, with most of the increase occurring after 2002. China is now the 
biggest carbon emitter in the world, producing a quarter of all energy related CO2 emissions 
globally in 2010. The building sector is a major energy user. In 2010, it accounted for 30% of 
China’s total energy consumption. Thus energy efficiency in buildings is one key factor to 
curbing China’s contribution to global warming.  
The Chinese government has taken a number of policy measures to promote Green Building 
practices, including financial incentives for energy efficiency in buildings. Ex-post evalutation 
is key to any policy-making process, and while policy expectations are high on what Green 
Building can do for the economy, health, environment and climate, there has been little 
evaluation and few empirical studies of the actual impacts of the new Chinese Green Building 
economic incentives.  
To address this knowledge gap, this thesis examines the economic efficiency of Chinese Green 
Building being driven by market-based instruments, using the Four-High Community Award 
of Shanghai and its application and impact on the Chenghuaxinyuan housing scheme as a case 
study. Chenghuaxinyuan was built by the leading real-estate developer company Vanke, with 
some ambitious Green Building features such as solar water heaters, green roofs, low-emission 
insulating glass windows and exterior walls with a better-than-average U-value. It achieved a 3-
star rating in the Chinese Green Building Label system. The Four-High Award is granted by 
city of Shanghai to housing projects that represent planning with a high ambition starting 
point, high design level, high quality construction, and high-level management. It was granted 
to Chenghuaxinyuan in 2011. 
Data availability was critical for the choice of case study policy and project. Data collection 
methods included a critical literature review of scientific journal papers, and semistructured 
interviews conducted on site in Shanghai with relevant stakeholders (e.g. architects, engineers, 
consultants and academics). 
The main method for data analysis was a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), which is the 
operational and pragmatic form to approach ‘Potential Pareto Improvements’. Investment, 
administration and transaction costs were estimated and compared to economic, 
environmental and social benefits generated. In addition, a Cost-Revenue Analysis was 
performed to investigate the financial feasibility of the Green Building measures from the 
developer’s and the residents’ point of view respectively. Indicators produced by the analysis 
were net present value, internal rate of return, benefit-cost ratio and payback period. Different 
discount rates were used. Each analysis was subjected to a sensitivity analysis, modifying key 
variables to determine their influence on the result, thereby getting an approximation of the 
degree of uncertainty of the overall outcome. 
The main findings of this research can be summarised as follows. CBA results are highly 
dependent on a number of key assumptions and choices, data quality and availability and 
resulting estimates. The most critical aspects are the estimation of energy savings achieved and 
the estimation of external socio-environmental benefits. Conservative estimates were used for 
all variables. With a “base case” set of conservative assumptions, the benefit-cost ratio of the 
Four-High Award for Chenghuaxinyuan and the Green Building measures it is promoting is 
0,71; the internal rate of return is 3,1%, and the net present value is -24,97 million yuan. With 
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these results, the measures must be considered economically inefficient from society’s point of 
view: socio-environmental benefits are outweighed by incremental investment costs. 
However, as long as the costs are instead covered by the price premium paid by customers, 
the Green Building measures are still economically viable, which is why a “neutral” CBA 
approach disreagarding the price premium paid by customers and pointing to a loss to society 
is somewhat misleading. In reality no party really loses. The expenses of the government are 
by far recouped by the socio-environmental benefits, the while the developer’s incremental 
costs is covered many times over by the price premium, which in turn represents an added 
value, i.e. a benefit in the form of sustainable, high-status living for which customers in a 
certain market segment are willing to pay. Having said that, it is still a main finding that with 
current policy design, socio-environmental benefits do not outweigh costs by themselves. 
The sensitivity analysis confirms the high dependency on the key assumptions mentioned 
above, especially the estimation of externalities and the discount rate, indicating an overall 
midrange uncertainty of the results. Most importantly it indicates that a rise in electricity price 
or greater energy savings, or a combination of those, could change the outcome into an 
economically beneficial one from society’s point of view. 
The cost-revenue analysis indicates a very poor deal from the residents’ perspective, financially 
speaking. The internal rate of return for the residents “investment in Green living” is -14,6%, 
and the net present value is -6137,6 yuan/m2. Payback time never occurs. This points to other 
factors, such as environmental and status regards, as being more important than price to real-
estate customers in this market segment. To the developer, the extra investment for producing 
a Green Building is extremely profitable thanks to the vast price premium paid by customers. 
The internal rate of is return of 2361,8% and the net present value over 1,9 billion yuan. 
Interview findings indicate that fiscal policy incentives such as subsidies and awards are less 
important factors when Chinese real-estate developers consider Green Building. The desire 
and need for good relations to local government appears to be much more important. 
Another major driver is branding regards: major real-estate developers want to claim 
leadership in Sustainable Architecture to the market. 
To improve the efficiency of Green Building policy, tougher building codes, higher energy 
performance standards, reduced energy price distortions (including the internalization of 
negative externalities and subsidy removal) are recommended. The Four High Community 
Award as a policy instrument itself could be sharpened by setting specific maximum energy 
use caps for buildings eligible for the Award.  
Serving as a signal of the government’s intentions and a financial incentive for improvement, 
the Award potentially spurs and inpires energy savings in projects across the market. If those 
energy savings were estimated and taken into account, the Award might in fact turn out to be 
very cost-effective, as a way to influence all developers by rewarding one. A more extensive 
and complex CBA might determine this. Hence further research is suggested on the economic 
efficiency of a single award considering its marked-wide influence in the analysis. Further 
research is also recommended to obtain higher quality input data (including co-benefits of 
increased energy efficiency), which would enable a more detailed and reliable analysis of the 
economic efficiency of market-based Green Building instruments. 
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1 Introduction 
China’s steadily increasing greenhouse gas emissions are intimately linked with the growing 
energy need of the Chinese economy, where the building sector is a major energy user. In 
order to cope with the accelerating stress on climate, nature, society and human health caused 
by the energy consumption of the building sector, China has taken a number of policy 
measures to promote Green Building practices, including financial incentives for energy 
efficiency in buildings. This paper examines the economic efficiency of those measures. The 
question is, simply put: if government pays companies to build energy efficient buildings, how 
much energy and cost savings does society get for the money? Does it pay off? 
1.1 Background: growth, energy, climate, buildings and policy 
China’s economy has expanded rapidly ever since the early 1990s, with double-digit growth 
rates some of the years, particularly between 2003 and 2007. As a result of this booming 
economic activity – production and consumption - national energy use has seen an 
unprecedented increase – almost doubling in the seven years from  2002 to 2009, from 47 to 
90 exajoules. (Kahrl, Roland-Holst, & Zilberman, 2013). As China’s energy sector is heavily 
coal-power based, this in turn has led to a steep rise in CO2 emissions. Annual CO2 emissions 
grew from 1454.65 Mtons in 1980 to 7706.83 Mtons in 2009, with most of the increase 
occurring after 2002 (X. Liu, 2012, p. 2). China is now the biggest carbon emitter in the world, 
producing a quarter of all energy related CO2 emissions globally in 2010 (Lu, Stegman, & Cai, 
n.d.). 
In 2010, the building sector accounted for 30% of China’s total energy consumption (Y. Liu, 
2012). As urbanisation continues, hundreds of millions of people move from simple, low-
comfort countryside homes with negligible energy consumption to modern high-comfort 
urban dwellings with high demand for heating, cooling and appliances powering energy. 
Current floor area growth rate in China is around one billion m2 per year, predominantly 
added in urban areas where per capita energy use is 3,5 times higher than in the countryside 
(Y. Liu, 2012). Again, from a global climate perspective, this rise in building related energy 
demand and the resulting increase in coal-fired power production is a critical problem. Thus 
energy efficiency in buildings is one key factor to curbing China’s contribution to global 
warming. 
China’s government is increasingly recognising and reacting to this challenge. The new energy 
plan of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the top authority in 
energy matters, specifies energy efficiency targets for the building sector among others, a 
decision that has repercussions in the policies of other authorities down the political line of 
command. According to the 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development, released on January 
1 2013, the overall energy efficiency of the economy should increase by 38% to 2015 
compared to 2010 levels (“China Releases 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development,” 
2013). For the building sector this ambition is reflected in policy measures on the different 
administrative levels to promote Green Building practices, i.e. construction of energy efficient 
new buildings and energy efficiency improvement measures in existing ones. On the national 
level, the goal is that 30% of all new buildings built between 2012 and 2020 be Green 
Buildings (Lu-Hill & Chen, 2013).  
Many policy measures addressing building resource efficiency were introduced long before the 
Green Building concept was known in China. In 1986 a “mandatory energy-saving rate” for 
new buildings was established: 30% compared to a baseline level, which was in turn based on 
the energy demand of a typical residential building in the cold-winter-hot-summer climate 
zone in 1980-1981. The rate has been gradually raised and is now 65% in Shanghai and 
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Beijing. This is a design standard, i.e. it applies to the pre-construction design of the building 
rather than the actual built result – there is no follow-up on whether the energy savings 
intended by design are actually achieved. (W. l. Lee & Chen, 2008)(Y. Liu, 2012)(Cai, 2010). 
Since then a host of policy measures of different types has been introduced on various levels, 
see table 2-1 below. A number of Green Building policy measures have also been introduced 
and then withdrawn again. The tax reduction on fixed asset investment in Green Building 
property is one example (Fan, Zhu, & Wang, 2013, p. 811). Environmental policy reversal 
ocurred chiefly in the late ninetees due to concerns that such policy might restrain economic 
growth (Qian, Chan, & Xu, 2011, p. 5). 
The China Green Building Label (CGBL, a.k.a. 3Star), listed under Informative Instruments in 
table 2-1, is a voluntary Green Building certification system, the second biggest one in China, 
the biggest being the American LEED label. CGBL was introduced by the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban and Rural Development (MOHURD) in 2006 in order to establish a 
voluntary domestic evaluation standard tailored for Chinese conditions. In Green Building 
certification systems, buildings are assessed and awarded credits for their performance in 
aspects such as energy efficiency, sustainable materials, site/land use, etc., resulting in an 
overall rating for the project, e.g. Silver, Gold or Platinum in LEED, or one, two or three stars 
in CGBL (Voynas, 2013). According to the Chinese website Green Building Map (“China 
green building - green building map - gbmap.org,” n.d.), there were 1995 buildings in China 
certified to either CGBL, LEED or other labels on August 16, 2013. Already by 2014 all new 
state-owned low-income residential buildings must be certified to the Chinese Green Building 
Label (Lu-Hill & Chen, 2013). 
However, it is the market-based instruments, MBIs, also known as fiscal instruments or 
financial incentives, that are the subject of this thesis. Market-based policy instruments 
typically use market mechanisms such as demand and supply, pricing, etc. to create economic 
incentives for companies to behave in a certain way, e.g. more environmentally responsibly, in 
difference to regulatory (“command-and-control”) instruments, which simply demand a 
certain conduct by companies. When MBIs work as intended, they drive market actors to 
accomplish the result desired by society in the most cost-efficient way. Tradable permits and 
certificates, subsidies and taxes are all used in various MBIs. (Kete, 1994)(Stavins, 2003).  
1.2 Problem definition 
The Chinese government has high expectations on Green Buildings; for saving energy, 
reducing CO2 emissions, improving indoor comfort and air quality, stimulating the domestic 
clean-tech industry, among other things. The policy instruments presented in section 2.3 
represent a concerted effort on behalf of the government to promote Green Building 
practices in China, many of them being part of the “Green Economic Stimulus Packages” of 
the last two Five Year Plans. 
Ex-post evalutation is key to any policy-making process. In order to point out, diagnose and 
analyse problems and challenges in the performance of a policy, and suggest improvements in 
its design so as to work better, a systematic outsider assessment employing academic research 
methods to attain the highest possible objectivity is indispensable. Without proper ex-post 
evaluation, there is the risk of a policy doing more harm than good, and continuing to do so. 
For MBIs, economic efficiency is of particular interest, as a proxy for how well they are 
working and what value society gets for its money spent. There has been little evaluation and 
few empirical studies of the actual impacts of the new Chinese Green Building economic 
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incentives and MBIs (Fan et al., 2013, p. 7), and more research is needed (Qian & Chan, 2009, 
p. 19)(Qian et al., 2011, p. 14).  
Despite an extensive scholar literature search, no peer-reviewed papers on this specific 
problem in the Chinese Green Building context were found. Dhakal (2009) does an in-depth 
examination of the energy and carbon aspects of big cities and urbanisation in China, looking 
into policy options, but not their economic efficiency. L. Li et al. (2010) make a projection of 
the future emissions of Shanghai based on current and planned energy policies, estimating 
their effectiveness, but not their economic efficiency. Jia Li et al. (2004) model the health 
benefits of curbing air pollution in Shanghai and perform cost-benefit analysis on the 
economic efficiency of pollution abatement strategies, but the focus is on industry and power 
production sources rather Green Building. Price et al. (2011) conduct a broad assessment of 
the performance of chosen programmes across the entire national array of energy-saving 
policies in China, pointing at progresses and challenges, but without calculating their 
economic efficiency. D. Liu, Wang, Zhou, & Zhang (1997) investigate the cost-effectiveness 
of demand-side management of energy use in Shanghai, performing a cost-benefit analysis, 
but not on Green Building policies. Gielen & Changhong (2001) look into the benefits of 
emission reduction, assessing fiscal policy instruments, but not Green Building related ones. 
Zhong et al. (2009) present an interesting mathematical model for the feasibility of 
government financial support to energy effieciency retrofit projects in northern China as a 
function of the relationship between energy price, social and environmental externalities, and 
government- and company-borne project cost respectively, but it is a theoretical ex-ante 
model and does not produce a benefit-cost ratio of an actual policy measure (Zhong, Cai, Wu, 
& Ren, 2009). 
The interviews and literature review (see section 2.1) also yielded very little specific 
information on MBI related support to building projects for energy-saving measures, or 
estimations of amounts of energy saved. This further reinforced the justification for the 
research itself. The only project-specific data of that kind was found in the MSc. thesis “Green 
Building development in China - a policy-oriented research with a case study of Shanghai” by 
Yujun Liu (Y. Liu, 2012). Hence that paper is the primary source of numeric data for the cost-
benefit analysis, supplemented with additional data from other sources, including some 
presentations on the same building project, and assumptions based on or deducted from 
interview findings and literature review findings. 
Hence it is concluded that there is a knowledge gap regarding the economic efficiency of 
Green Building MBIs in China, due to a lack of ex-post evaluation studies. 
1.3 Research objective and research questions 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the economic perfomance of Chinese market-based 
Green Building policy instruments from a societal cost-benefit point of view, by conducting 
an economic efficiency analysis, using a specific policy applied on a specific project as a case 
study. Policy programme costs, such as administration, regulation, investment and transaction 
costs, will be identified/estimated and compared to the resulting economic, environmental 
and social benefits, both private and public. The study also aims to investigate the financial 
implications of the policy for building energy end-users, i.e. residents, and building producers, 
i.e. real-estate developers. 
To that end, the study takes the “Four high Community Award” building intiative in Shanghai, 
and its application in the Chenghuaxinyuan housing project, as a case study. See section 2.3 
for details. 
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The research questions of the study are: 
- What is the economic efficiency of the Four High Community Award as a market-based 
policy instrument for Green Buildings in Shanghai? 
- What are the financial net benefits (if any) for end-users (residents)? 
- What are the financial net benefits (if any) for real-estate developers? 
 
1.4 Scope and limitations 
The topic of the thesis is the economic efficiency of market-based instruments addressing 
building energy efficiency, and their investment risk implications. This is further scoped down 
to focus on one specific instrument. The scope is as follows: 
• Geographic: China/Shanghai 
• Sector: Residential 
• Policy instrument: Four High Community Award (Green Building financial incentive) 
• Technology: Energy Efficiency 
• Project: Chenghuaxinyuan housing scheme by Vanke Ltd., Shanghai 
A limitation to the research is the fact the author does not speak or read Chinese, while a lot 
of the literature on the subject and the vast majority of project/policy specific data available 
from companies and authorities is in Chinese. Moreover, given the importancce of guanxí, - 
interpersonal relationships or social contact networks – to many activities within Chinese 
society (Guo, 2001), the author’s lack of said guanxí may further hamper attempts to establish 
contact with and gather data from companies and authories. 
1.5 Target audience 
The thesis is aimed at an audience that may be interested in Chinese Green Building policy 
efficiency, primarily: 
• Chinese policy makers 
• Housing companies 
• Real estate developers 
• Construction business 
• Researchers in the field 
• Green Building consultants 
1.6 Thesis outline 
Chapter 1, Introduction, presents the background of the study, elaborating on the relationship 
between economic growth, energy use, climate change, the building sector and Green Building 
policy. It also defines the research problem of the study, states research objective and research 
questions, defines the scope of thesis, mentions limitations, identifies the target audience and 
outlines the content of the paper. 
Chapter 2, Research methodology and case study introduction, presents the methods used for data 
collection, and briefly explains the theory and practice of cost-benefit analysis, cost-revenue 
analysis, sensitivity analysis and discounting.  It also gives a brief overview of Chinese and 
The Economic Efficiency of Market-Based Green Building Policy Instruments in China 
5 
Shanghai Green Building policy instruments, and then introduces the policy instrument and 
the project to be studied.  
Chapter 3, Findings and analysis, presents and analyses the interview findings and the results of 
the cost-benefit analysis, the two cost-revenue analyses, and sensitivity analysis of all three.  
Chapter 4, Discussion, reviews the reliability and the meaning of the results in a wider 
perspective, in turn discussing housing price premium and incremental cost, Green Building 
policies and drivers, and the uncertainty of the input data and the results. 
Chapter 5, Conclusions, policy recommendations and further research, presents the conclusions drawn 
from the results, and proposes certain improvements to existing Green Building policies in 
China. It concludes by pointing out relevant scopes for further studies on the topic. 
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2 Research methodology and case study introduction 
This chapter aims to lay the methodological foundations for this thesis. It presents the design 
of the research methodology, serving as a logical approach to get from ‘research questions’ to 
‘findings and conclusions’. It elaborates on the methods used for data collection and analysis. 
It also introduces the chosen Green Building policy to be assessed and the housing project 
used for the case study. 
2.1 Methods for data collection 
Data collection commenced with a critical literature review of scientific journal papers on the 
subject, searching for data on Chinese Green Building projects, in order to identify a study 
case project and relevant stakeholders. Lund University's eLibrary was searched for peer-
reviewed journal articles on the costs and benefits of market-based policy instruments 
targeting building energy efficiency in China. 
Semistructured interviews were conducted on site in Shanghai in July (15-19) 2013 with relevant 
stakeholders such as sustainable construction architects, engineers, consultants and academics. 
See Appendix I for the interview protocol employed. The purpose of the interviews was to 
gather data on specific projects where fiscal Green Building policy incentives had been applied 
and the energy savings achieved there, but also on the Green Building policy situation in 
general. After the field trip e-mail correspondence continued with some of the interviewees1.  
2.2 Methods for data analysis 
2.2.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, CBA, is mathematic method designed to support decision-making 
processes, often applied in policymaking. When faced with market failures, such as 
environmental degradation due to economic activity, and considering its options for 
intervention, government may employ CBA in order to compare the costs of policy options 
with the benefits that they are expected to generate, to be able to decide which measure is 
likely to maximize the net benefits for the society as a whole (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, 
& Weimer, 1998). CBA is the operational form to approach economic efficiency (i.e. Pareto 
improvements) (Tietenberg, 2006). 
According to a number of authors, CBA is the approach normally applied in economic 
efficiency assessments (see e.g. Rossi (1999), Stavins (2004), and Tietenberg (2006). It is often 
considered a realistic approach to identifying whether an efficient outcome (or ´Potential 
Pareto Improvement), delivers the maximisation of social welfare (i.e. maximise the difference 
between total social benefits and costs). Note that there is a consensus in the literature about 
how ambitious and challenging—or sometimes impracticable—it is to perform a CBA in 
policy evaluation (Harrington, Morgenstern, & Sterner, 2004; Sterner, 2003; Tietenberg, 2006). 
CBA has been criticised because of, for instance, it provides no accountability for 
distributional effects, it brings up the problematic practice of discounting, and it assumes that 
governments are social-profit maximisers. The technique also becomes controversial when 
specific monetary values are attached non-market impacts (Tietenberg, 1996). 
For a policy measure or an investment to be feasible, benefits should outweigh costs. In an 
environmental policymaking context CBA, all costs and benefits that can be identified are 
                                                
1 Efforts were also made to reach policymakers, authorities and real-estate developers, in order to be able to interview them as 
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considered, public and private. Costs may be government expenses for e.g. subsidies, 
companies’ investments or loss of revenues, increased living costs to citizens, transaction and 
administrative costs, etc. Benefits may be financial savings due to lower resource 
consumption, but usually also include the reduction of external social and environmental cost, 
so-called externalities, i.e. costs caused onto society by a certain market activity but not paid 
for by the market actors involved. Socio-environmental externalities are usually in themselves 
non-monetary, i.e. health problems, while they do bring monetary costs along as well, i.e. 
healthcare costs. In order to capture the significance of non-monetary externalities in a CBA, 
their monetary value is estimated using a valuation method of choice, e.g. the contingent 
valuation method, the hedonic pricing method, the travel cost method, or other. . 
Based on the widely accepted idea in economics that it is generally preferred to have a given 
amount of money sooner rather than later, i.e. that it is attributed a higher value at present 
than in the future, costs and benefits that are projected to be incurred in the future are 
discounted, cut, by a certain percentage, discount rate. The discount rate reflects time preference, 
the subjective appraisal of how much more significant a present cost or benefit is to be 
regarded than one incurred e.g. in five years.  
After discounting all projected future costs and benefits, they are added and subtracted 
respectively together with the initial costs of the project, yielding a net present value for the 
whole project. A policy measure CBA that yields a positive net present value, considering 
internal, external, monetary and (monetised) non-monetary costs, indicates that the policy 
measure is feasible from a societal-economic point of view. 
Another output of CBA is benefit-cost ratio. This is simply the ratio between benefits and costs, 
i.e. the sum of discounted benefits divided by the sum of discounted and initial costs. A 
benefit-cost ratio above 1,0 indicates that the project or measure is feasible, while any ratio 
below that indicates the opposite. 
The mathematical formulation of the CBA rule is defined as: 
 
where the index t refers to time, Bt is the benefits taking place a time period t, Ct are the costs 
also at time period t, Et refers to the value of the environmental change, and d is the discount 
rate. Both B and C are aggregated across society. The decision rule is that the sum of the 
benefits less costs plus or minus the value of environmental change must be positive; all 
discounted to present value. 
If comparing multiple policy options, the one with the highest net present value, or benefit-
cost ratio, is to be preferred. 
A third output that can be calculated from the aggregate of costs and benefits, though strictly 
speaking not part of the CBA procedure as such, is the internal rate of return, IRR, i.e. the 
interest rate yielded by the investment in the project or policy measure. This is a more 
ambiguous figure that should not be used as the sole indicator of a project’s feasibility. 
In order to determine how sensitive the outcome is to changes in the input variables, and 
thereby to what extent each input variable influences the overall outcome, a sensitivity analysis 
should be performed. The sensitivity analysis ultimately gives an approximation of the 
reliability and uncertainty of the CBA results. There are a number of complex methods for 
∑ (Bt – Ct ± Et) * (1 + d) – t > 0
t=0
T
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this, but the most basic and commonly used is the One-At-a-Time (OAT) method, by which 
the CBA procedure is simply repeated number of times, each time changing the value of one 
of the input variables, while all other variables are kept at their original values. Any resulting 
changes in the output will then be due to that variable. The proportion between the change in 
the variable and the change in the output will reflect the significance of that variable for the 
overall result: the bigger the change in output per change in input, the more important the 
variable. This in turn indicates to what extent the certainty or data quality of the single variable 
affects the reliability of the CBA results. If the value of a variable is a mere assumption with a 
high degree of uncertainty, and that variable is found to have a major impact on the CBA 
result, then the CBA results themselves will also be highly uncertain.     
In the CBA of this study, the costs are the increase in the investment cost of the project 
developer due to Green Building measures, the public expense for the Four-High Award, and 
administrative and transaction costs borne by the developer and the city of Shanghai. In 
addition, the increase in price paid by residents may or may not be regarded as a cost in this 
context, see Chapter 4, Discussion. All costs are added into one total, initial cost, incurred at 
the beginning of the project (“year 0”), thus there is no need to discount them.  
The benefits are the energy-cost savings achieved and the avoided social and environmental 
externalities of coal-based energy production. These benefits are calculated and discounted for 
each year of the lifetime of the Green Building measure (in other words the lifetime of the 
housing scheme), yielding a series of diminishing annual net benefits. Together with the initial 
cost, they yield a benefit-cost ratio, a net present value and an internal rate of return. A 
sensitivity analysis is then conducted varying a number of variables to investigate the 
sensitivity and reliability of the result. 
A summary of the main assumptions and input data used and the sensitivity analysis 
conducted is presented in the Findings chapter. For a detailed description of the CBA 
procedure used in this paper, see Appendix II.  
2.2.2 Cost-Revenue Analysis 
A Cost-Revenue Analysis, CRA, works much in the same way as a CBA. The main difference 
is that instead of considering all types of costs and benefits to all stakeholders in society as a 
whole, it it focuses exclusively on financial aspects from one stakeholder’s point of view: it is 
financial analysis tool that focuses on private costs and benefits. 
In this study a CRA was conducted to investigate the financial feasibility of the Green 
Building measures from the developer’s and the residents’ point of view respectively. From 
the developer’s perspective, the cost is the incremental investment/technology purchase cost, 
and the revenue is the increase in the price paid by the residents. The residents’ point of view 
is the opposite; the increase of price is the cost and the revenue is the energy cost savings. As 
the energy costs are ultimately paid by residents, they do not affect the CRA for the developer. 
As in a CBA, future costs and revenues are discounted (discount rate 6% in the base case, 3% 
in the sensitivity analysis) and added together, and together with the initial investment cost 
they yield a an internal rate of return and a net present value, which indicate whether the 
measures make financial sense. 
2.3 Case study: policy and project 
Below is a table summarising the Green Building policy instruments in China. As can be seen 
there, there are a number of market-based instruments from which to choose for the study. 
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The most widespread fiscal Green Building policy instrument in China is subsidies (Zhiming, 
2013). On the national level, a policy adopted in May 2012 provides a 45 yuan/m2 subsidy for 
building projects achieving a CGBL two-star rating, and 80 yuan/m2 for three-star projects. So 
far, however, this subsidy has not yet been paid to any project – applications are still being 
processed. 
 
Table 2-1. Green Building policy instruments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
Category Instrument Adopted year Comment 
 National Laws Water Law of PRC 1988  
Environmental Protection Law of PRC 1989  
Urban Real Estate Management Law of 
PRC 
1994 
 
 
Law of PRC on the Prevention and Control 
of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste 
1995  
Energy Law of PRC 1997  
Energy Conservation Law of PRC 1997  
Law of PRC on Protecting Against and 
Mitigating Earthquake Disasters 
1997  
Construction Law of PRC 1998 This is the principal law 
regulating construction, 
including Green Building, 
i.e. the building code. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Law of 
PRC 
2002  
Renewable Energy Law of PRC 2005  
Urban and Rural Planning Law of PRC 2008  
Regulatory 
Instruments 
Mandatory minimum designing energy 
saving rate for newly-built buildings  
1986 Originally 30% and only in 
the North, later applied 
nationwide. Raised to 50% 
in 2005 and 65% in 2009 
for Beijing and Shanghai. 
 Regulations on wall material production 1991 Latest revision in 1997. 
 Standards on building envelope design, 
construction material and appliance 
2002  
 Acceptance standards on indoor decoration 2003  
 Mandatory labeling and certification 
programs for electrical appliances 
2005  
 Regulations on project inspection of energy-
efficient building envelope 
2005  
 Regulations on construction supervision 
especially of energy-efficient projects 
2006  
 Designing Standard for Energy 
Conservation in Civil Building 
2006  
 Mandatory use of water-saving appliances in 
fully-furnished apartments 
2011  
Category Instrument Adopted year Comment 
Informative 
instruments 
Local Five Year Plan (FYP) (2001) Local FYP:s have been 
used as informative 
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instruments on energy 
since the 10th FYP in 2001. 
 National Green Building Innovation Award 2004  
 China Green Building Label  2006 A.k.a. 3Star. See below. 
 Local green building certification systems 2008  
 Demonstration programs on garbage 
classification, renewable energy application, 
green building, etc. 
n.d.  
 Awareness raising, education, information 
campaigns about green building 
n.d.  
Market based 
instruments 
Tax reduction on new green construction 
material 
2003  
 The “Four-high” community award 2007 Granted by the city of 
Shanghai to residential 
housing schemes for 
various sustainability 
aspects. 
 Tax reduction for companies conducting 
energy/water conservation and 
environmental protection projects 
2007 (national 
level) 
 
 Local special fund and soft loans for energy 
conservation and renewable energy 
programs 
2008  
 Local subsidies on renewable energy and 
energy efficient products 
2009  
 National subsidy for CGBL 2- and 3-star 
rated buildings. 
2012 Not yet disbursed. 
 “Shanghai City Building Energy Saving 
Projects Special Support Measures” 
2012 Subsidies for various Green 
Building aspects of 
Shanghai projects. 
Sources: (Cai, 2010)(Y. Liu, 2012)(Lu-Hill & Chen, 2013) 
On the provincial level, the city of Shanghai (being its own province) introduced the 
“Shanghai City Building Energy Saving Projects Special Support Measures” (“
!办 ”) in September 2012. The policy provides a host of different 
subsidies for different types of buildings, summarised in table 2-2 below. The subsidies may be 
recieved in addition to national government subsidies. 
Table 2-2. Summary, Shanghai Green Building subsidies.  
Category General requirements Floor area requirements Technical requirements Subsidy 
1. CGBL certified 
building projects 
Two Star rating 
 
 
Residential:                          
≥ 25 000 m2 
For public buildings: 
Energy consumption sub-
metering, monitoring, and 
reporting to the 
Municipal Government 
Building Bureau. 
60 yuan/m2 
(Max. 6 million 
yuan) 
 
Individual 
public/commercial:             
≥ 10 000 m2 
Three Star rating Residential:  ≥ 10 000 m2 
Individual public/comm.:      
≥ 5 000 m2 
 
Category General requirements Floor area requirements Technical requirements Subsidy 
2. Prefabricated building 
projects 
The building must be at 
least 15% prefabricated. 
≥ 25 000 m2  15%-25% 
prefabricated:      
60 yuan/m2    
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(max. 10 million 
yuan) 
≥ 25% 
prefabricated:   
100 yuan/m2   
(max. 10 million 
yuan) 
3. New buildings with 
high energy efficiency 
Residential or public 
building.                     
Energy demand 70% 
lower than the baseline of 
the mandatory energy-
saving rate.  
Individual residential 
buildings:                            
≥ 50 000 m2 
Design integrated exterior 
window shading.  
For public buildings; 
same as for category 1. 
60 yuan/m2 
(max. 6 million 
yuan) 
Individual public buildings:  
≥ 20 000 m2 
4. Existing buildings with 
high energy efficiency 
Energy-saving retrofitting 
of an existing building. 
Achieving an energy 
demand 50% lower than 
the baseline of the 
mandatory energy-saving 
rate. 
Residential:  
≥ 10 000 m2 
For public buildings; 
same as for category 1. 
60 yuan/m2 
(max. 6 million 
yuan) 
Individual public buildings: 
≥ 20 000 m2 
5. Exterior window or 
window shading 
renovations of existing 
buildings 
Existing building. 
Exterior window or 
window shading 
renovation project. 
 
Residential:  
≥ 5 000 m2 
 
Compliance with 
applicable design 
standards (DGJ08-205 
and DGJ08-107 or 
JGJ237.) 
For public buildings; 
same as for category 1. 
Window OR 
shading 
renovation:        
150 yuan/m2 
window area. 
Ind. public buildings: 
≥ 10 000 m2 
Window AND 
shading 
renovation:        
250 yuan/m2 
window area 
6. Onsite renewable 
energy 
Building project with 
onsite renewable energy 
sources, e.g. 
photovoltaics, solar 
heating or ground-source 
heatpump. 
One renewable energy 
source only; 
residential buildings:   ≥ 50 
000 m2 
public buildings:         ≥ 20 
000 m2 
For public buildings; 
same as for category 1. 
Solar heating or 
ground-source 
heatpump: 
60 yuan/m2 
benefitted area 
Two or more renewable 
energy sources; 
residential buildings:   ≥ 40 
000 m2 
public buildings:         ≥ 15 
000 m2  
Photovoltaics: 5 
yuan/Watt 
installed 
7. Green roofs and walls Public buildings located in 
key areas of Shanghai. 
Green (vegetation) roof 
and walls. 
 Green roof area ≥ 1000 
m2 
or 
“general” type green wall 
area ≥ 1000 m2 
or 
“special” type green wall 
area ≥ 500 m2 
Lawn roof: up to 
50 yuan/m2 
Plant roof: up to 
200 yuan/m2 
Combined 
lawn/plant roof: 
up to 100 yuan/m2 
“General” type 
green wall: up to 
30 yuan/m2 
“Special” type 
green wall: up to 
200 yuan/m2 
8. Building energy 
management and services  
Existing government 
office buildings, large 
public buildings. 
Energy sub-metering, 
energy audits and building 
services system projects. 
  Government will 
assist/support 
project. 
Source: (Lu-Hill & Chen, 2013)(“Shanghai City Building Energy Saving Projects Special Support 
Measures,” 2012) 
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For this study, the Four-High Community Award (listed under market-based instruments in 
table 2-1) was chosen, as it was the one policy instrument on which sufficient numeric data 
related to a specific project could be found. It is a financial incentive for “communities” 
(housing development) intended to spur developers to move forward with Green Building, as 
well as to create publicity and spread awareness. The name “Four High” refers to the 
prerequisites of the award: the rewarded community should represent planning with a high 
ambition starting point, high design level, high quality construction, and high level 
management.  
The residential scheme Chenghuaxinyuan received the Four High Community Award in 2011 
from the City of Shanghai. For Chenghuaxinyuan, the Award was 4,25 million yuan, granted 
for great Green Building design, with particular emphasis on the energy efficiency 
acheivements (Y. Liu, 2012). Situated on the outskirts of Shanghai, Chenghuaxinyuan was 
developed by Vanke, China’s biggest real estate developer in the residential sector. It is a gated 
community in a park environment with extensive gardening and water features, mid-rise slab 
blocks built in what the company proudly markets as “Art Deco style”. Stage 1 of the 
development comprises 365 764 m2 (Y. Liu, 2012). It achieved a three star rating, the highest 
in the China Green Building Label system.(“www.lvdichan.com,” n.d.)  
The Green Building design features include a better insulated building envelope than in typical 
residential construction (a U-value between 0,79 and 0,94 W/m2K which is lower (i.e. better) 
than business-as-usual, yet notably higher (worse) than in e.g. Swedish standard (non-Green 
Building) constructions), low-emission insulating glass windows, sedum green roofs, 
permeable garden grounds, and a selection of building services systems and appliances of 
generally higher-than-standard efficiency. (“wenku.baidu.com: #	_,” 
n.d.) 
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Table 2-3. Chenghuaxinyuan, general information 
Item Data Source/comment 
Name Chenghuaxinyuan Means “New Park City Flowers”. 
Address Minhang District Dongchun Road, Shanghai (“http://thape.com,” n.d.) 
Construction year 2009 (“http://thape.com,” n.d.) 
Developer Shanghai Dongyuanmeiye Real Estate Ltd., 
for Vanke 
(“http://thape.com,” n.d.)                          
Total investment 1 billion yuan (“www.lvdichan.com,” n.d.)      
Obviously an approximation. 
Land area 55 353,6 m2 (“www.lvdichan.com,” n.d.) 
Construction area 365 764 m2 (Y. Liu, 2012)                                       
Stage 1. 
Buildings 18 buildings: “Nine multi-layer, three high-
level and six small high-rise residential 
buildings”  
(“www.lvdichan.com,” n.d.)         
Difficult to interpret, but of little 
importance to the study. 
Certification 3 star rating in CGBL (Y. Liu, 2012)                                     
The highest rating within CGBL. 
Tenure Condominium. (J Li, n.d.)(Y. Liu, 2012)                                                  
Interpretation/assumption. Residents 
“buy” their homes, and extensive 
services are provided by Vanke. 
Main Green 
Building features 
• naturally lit underground parking space 
• building envelope designed to meet 
energy-saving rate of 65% of the 
standard requirements 
• solar hot water system for 62,6% of 
residents 
• collection and storeage of rainwater, 
local infiltration and utilization 
• prefabricated concrete element 
structure for more efficient and less 
disturbing construction 
• sedum green roofs 
• low-emission insulating glass windows 
• self-balanced ventilation system 
• conventient waste recycling system 
(J Li, n.d.) 
(“www.lvdichan.com,” n.d.) 
Note that only a few of the measures are 
directly related to energy consumption. 
Exterior wall U-
value 
0,79 - 0,94 W/m2K (J Li, n.d.) 
 For detailed Green Building related cost data etc., see table 3-1. 
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3 Findings and analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the main findings and analysis of the study. In 
accordance with the research objective, methods applied, key observations and conclusions 
are elaborated. Throughout the chapter, explanations are also provided regarding the 
relationships between the different findings and how they build on one another. 
3.1 Market-based policy instruments as a driver for Green Building 
A somewhat unexpected outcome of the interviews conducted on site in Shanghai was the 
recurring assertion from interviewees that fiscal policy incentives such as subsidies and grants 
play only a minor role for the motivation of developers that choose to carry out their projects 
as Green Buildings. The primary driver appears to be the desire and need for good relations to 
local government. (E. Lee, 2013) 
According to professor Che Xueya, deputy chief architect at Tongji Architectural Design Co. 
Ltd. and board member of the Shanghai Green Building Council, the drivers and motives for 
Green Building developers are a mix of political pressure and persuation, branding 
considerations, energy cost-saving, and subsidies. Subsidies are small compared to other costs 
and benefits in real estate projects, and so play more of a psychological role to persuade 
developers into building green. Once the benefits of energy efficient construction become 
generally known and accepted by the market, subsidies will be phased out, professor Xueya 
believes. (Xueya, 2013) 
However, subsidies also serve to indicate the government’s intentions, which are observed 
with greater attention in China than in most other countries. For a Chinese real estate 
developer that wants to grow and prosper, a good relationship to local government is crucial 
(Zhang & Zhang, 2013). The fact that various Green Building measures are being subsidised 
may make companies consider those measures, not so much for the money as for their 
political value. 
The secondary motivation is often branding, according to interviewees. The bigger developers 
are competing to be the leader in ‘Sustainable Architecture’, which is now a high status 
business. The fact that the government is a major opinion-former in China, and that it is 
pointing the market in the direction of Green Building, further increases the prestige of such 
projects, as well as the prestige of living in a Green Building. This is reflected by the fact that 
Vanke are able to add a price premium (compared to the average price for newly built housing 
in Shanghai) to the residents of  Chenghuaxinyuan 29 times the incremental investment cost 
of the actual Green Building measures (Y. Liu, 2012). 
3.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
3.2.1 Data input and key assumptions, base case 
The CBA scenario presented whose data input and key assumptions are presented in this 
section, and whose results are presented in section 3.2.2, is hereafter referred to as the “base 
case”, as opposed to the various alternative cases that the sensitivity analysis gives rise to. The 
assumptions for the base case are generally rather conservative. 
The economic efficiency of the financial support to Green Building measures in the 
Chenghuaxinyuan housing scheme is highly dependent on what assumptions are made. Since 
the increase in price for residents, the so-called price premium, is almost thirty-fold the 
incremental investment cost of the developer, it may be discussed whether it is wholly 
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attributable to the Green Building measures, and therefore a Green Building related cost, or 
not. However, since the very same price premium is a benefit to the developer, and not a cost,  
it is neither from society’s point of view: it is merely an internal transaction, and therefore it is 
disregarded in the CBA. In the CRA, on the other hand, it is major factor. See section 3.3. 
The same is true for the prize sum of the Award itself, which is merely transferred from one 
party to another. Y. Liu (2012) reports “Administrative costs borne by developer 
(certification)” of 47 247 yuan, which is the fee for having the project registered and evaluated 
for CGBL, but this too is an internal transaction. Thus neither is considered a cost in the 
CBA. However, there may be other truly administrative costs occurring on behalf of 
developer as well as authorities. This issue is considered in the sensitivity analysis. 
One important assumption concerns the energy savings. No specific numbers on energy 
consumption could be found for Chenghuaxinyuan, only details on parts of the climate system 
and building envelope. However the granting of Award requires achieving energy savings of 
65% compared to the national baseline, i.e. meeting the new Shanghai standard (which few 
buildings do so far). Other buildings that achieve this (on which data was found) have an 
energy consumption of around 40 kWh/m2a (Connelly, 2012), i.e. about 25 kWh/m2a lower 
than the typical energy use of a modern Chinese residential building (Zhang & Zhang, 2013). 
Thus an energy saving of 25 kWh/m2a adhering to the awarded Green Building measures was 
assumed in the calculus. Heating and cooling is assumed to be done by air-to-air heat pump 
ventilators, based on presentations on the housing scheme (J Li, n.d.). Then the question 
whether the assumed 40 kWh/m2a are a heating/cooling demand or an energy consumption for 
heating and cooling gets important, as a modern air-to-air heat pump with a coefficient of 
performance of 200% would satisfy a demand of 40 kWh/m2a by consuming only 20 
kWh/m2a. However, considering the U-value and other specs of the building envelope, it is 
unlikely with an energy demand that low, and hence 40 kWh/m2a is assumed to be the energy 
consumption. Energy demand is a relative concept, as it depends on what indoor temperature 
residents are willing to accept, which in turn depends on cultural and economic context (see 
Cai, 2010, pp. 10–13). Energy consumption, on the other hand, can be readily measured. 
In any case the fuel is electricity, and externalities of energy consumption should be calculated 
on typical Chinese marginal electricity production, i.e. coal power. The assumption is based on 
the Greenpeace report “The true cost of coal in China” (Yushi et al., 2008), that investigates 
the socio-environmental external costs from Chinese coal power production, including 
mining. The report’s estimate of 698 yuan/ton coal (Yushi et al., 2008, p. 60) is multiplied by 
the average domestic coal consumption for power supply in 2011, 0,33 ton/Mwh (Yinbiao, 
2013), yielding a total external cost of 230 yuan/MWh. For data quality discussion, see section 
3.2.3 Sensitivity analysis and Chapter 4, Discussion.  
Table 3-1. Main assumptions, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Item Value Source / comment 
Floor area 365 764 m2 (Y. Liu, 2012) 
Discount rate 6% Based on Mundaca & Neij (2009); official social discount rate. 
3% also tested in sensitivity analysis. 
Lifespan 40 years Assumption. Actual building lifespan impossible to predict, 
40 years assumed maximum time perspective for customers. 
Energy savings 
due to Green 
Building 
measures 
25 kWh/m2a, 
totally 9 144 
MWh/a 
Assumption based on (Connelly, 2012) and (Zhang & Zhang, 
2013), for explanation see 3.2, paragraph 2. 
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Item Value Source / comment 
Electricity cost 470 
yuan/MWh 
(“Smart Grid Insights by Zpryme,” 2012) 
Avoided electricity cost equals a benefit. Cost is here assumed 
to correnspond to a flat electricity price. See sensitivity 
analysis for a test of electricity price increases corresponding 
to 2% and 5% annually. 
Socio-
environmental 
externalities 
230 
yuan/MWH 
Based on Greenpeace “The true cost of coal in China” (Yushi 
et al., 2008) and (Yinbiao, 2013)  
Avoided externalities equal benefits. 
Incremental cost 
borne by 
developer 
82 304 578 
yuan 
(Y. Liu, 2012) 
Transaction 
costs borne by 
developer 
10 205 390 
yuan 
(Y. Liu, 2012) 
3.2.2 CBA Results 
Using the assumptions and values listed above, the outcome of the benefit-cost ratio calculus 
procedure (see Appendix I) can be summarized as Σ(!! ∗ (1+ !)!!)Σ! = 66,192,6 = 0,71 
where B is the total benefits a given year (avoided energy cost and socio-environmental 
externalities) in million yuan, ∑C is the total project cost in million yuan, and d the discount 
rate (6%). 
Thus in the base case, the benefit-cost ratio of the Four-High Award for Chenghuaxinyuan 
and the Green Building measures it is promoting is 0,71, which means that for every yuan 
invested, only 0,71 yuan were generated. The internal rate of return is 3,1%, which is below 
any normal investment return target. The net present value is -24,97 million yuan, i.e. society 
loses this value due to the policy measure. The payback time for society as a whole is far past 
the assumed lifetime of the housing scheme or the planning horizon of residents, see Figure 3-
1. In this case, the measures must be considered economically inefficient from society’s point 
of view.  
Table 3-2. Cost-Benefit Analysis, results 
  
 
 
Indicator Result 
Benefit-cost ratio 0,71 
Internal rate of return 3,1% 
Net present value -24,97 million yuan 
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Figure 3-1. Cumulative discounted cost/benefits, Four High Award - Chenghuaxinyuan Green Building 
measures (discount rate 6%) 
 
3.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Using the OTA method for sensitivity analysis, the calculus was run a number of times varying 
certain key values each time, in order to determine the significance of the specific value for the 
result, and thus be able to judge the reliability of the outcome. Values that were varied were  
- external socio-environmental benefits 
- electricity price 
- discount rate  
Also, two new costs were tested: 
- administrative cost borne by authorities 
- administrative cost borne by the developer 
While the administrative cost of authorities and developer indicated by Liu (2012) is identical 
with the sum of the Award and the registration fee for CGBL respectively, both internal 
transactions and thus disregarded, one may suspect that further administrative cost may occur 
on behalf of authorities as well as developer. Therefore an additional 20% administrative cost 
is tested here for both. Both are found to have minimal impact on IRR, NVP and benefit-cost 
ratio. 
All the more critical is the valuation of socio-environmental externalities. While the 
Greenpeace report that the baseline case figure of 230 yuan/MWh is based on is relatively 
new (2008), written by expert academics such professor Mao Yushu of the Unirule Institute of 
Economics and Dr. Yang Fuqiang of the Energy Foundation, and has indeed been peer-
review by members of various Chinese scientific institutions and political bodies including the 
Ministry of Finance, it was not produced within the context of peer-reviewed academic-
scientific publications – it was produced by an environmental organisation whose objectivity is 
sometimes questioned.  
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Figures from a peer-review scientific journal article was found in Hirschberg et al. (2004, pp. 
167–168), who investigated the socio-environmental external costs from coal power 
production in the Shandong province (not Shanghai, but close) in 1998. An external cost of 
950 yuan/MWh can be deducted from this article, resulting in a total avoided external cost of 
8,69 million yuan per year for the project. The data quality problem here is the age of the data; 
the efficiency of combustion and the abatement of emissions in Chinese coal power plants is 
likely to have improved since then. However, if using this figure, the CBA changes 
dramatically. The Four-High Award for Chenghuaxinyuan, and the Green Building measures 
it is promoting, are then altogether feasible from a socioeconomic point of view. With all 
other assumptions as presented in table 3-1 and not regarding increased housing price as a 
cost, the benefit-cost ratio of the measures is 1,78; the internal rate of return 12,3%, and the 
net present value 68,63 million yuan. The payback time for society as a whole is about eleven 
and a half years, see Figure 3-2. The measures must be considered economically efficient, if 
only moderately. A lower discount rate improves economic efficiency further. 
If we, on the contrary, assume that Greenpeace is exaggerating the externalities, and cut their 
figure by 50%,  then the NPV too is cut by 50%, and the IRR by four fifths, while the benefit-
cost ratio only falls to 0,54. An in-between assumption of 460 yuan/MWh, twice the 
Greenpeace figure, but still less than half of that of Hirschberg et al., duplicates the NPV and 
more than duplicates the IRR, with a more moderate increase of benefit-cost ratio. In short, 
IRR is the most influenced by changes in externalities, NPV almost as strongly, and benefit-
cost ratio moderately so. 
 
Figure 3-2. Cumulative discounted costs/benefits, Four High Award - Chenghuaxinyuan Green Building 
measures – externalities assumption based on Hirschberg et al. (2004). Discount rate 6%. 
 
Conclusively the valuation of externalities is important for the outcome of the CBA. However, 
given the serious research approach of the Greenpeace report, authored and peer-reviewed by 
distinguished academics at renowned institutions respectively, the level of uncertainty of the 
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externalities estimate can be regarded as tolerable, and thus so can the uncertainty that it exerts 
onto the CBA result.  
Changes in electricity price have limited impact on IRR but a tangible impact on NPV. A 
duplication of the electricity price in the calculus corresponds to an annual electricity price 
increase of almost 5% for 40 years. This would increase the NPV by about 50%. Benefit-cost 
ratio is somewhat less affected. As electricity price is only likely to rise in the future, this 
increases the uncertainty of the CBA result towards the profitable side, increasing the 
likeliness of a more beneficial outcome. 
If only 20 kWh/m2a of energy savings are achieved, i.e. 20% lower than estimated, then it 
reduces IRR and NPV tangibly further, and benefit-cost ratio somewhat less. If on the other 
40% greater savings were to be achieved than estimated, it would improve economic 
efficiency greatly, yielding a clearly positive NPV, IRR and benefit-cost ratio. Although this is 
less likely, it is an important finding pointing to policy improvement opportunity. On the 
other hand, greater energy savings would also entail greater incremental investment cost, 
which would again worsen the figures. Addressing the question of how much would require a 
separate study. 
 
Figure 3-3. Cumulative discounted costs/benefits, Four High Award - Chenghuaxinyuan Green Building 
measures – assuming 5% annual increase in electricity price. Discount rate 6%.                                                                                    
The discount rate, finally, influences NPV and benefit-cost ratio even more. While IRR is not 
nearly as much affected, a halving of the discount rate more than duplicates NPV, and 
improves benefit-cost ratio almost as strongly. To conclude, the result of the CBA is very 
sensitive to changes in (the valuation of) the socio-environmental externalities of energy 
consumption and discount rate, and moderately sensitive to changes in electricity price, while 
administrative costs have litte impact. Better data on socio-environmental externalities would 
increase certainty significantly. 
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Table 3-3. Sensitivity Analysis, CBA 
Variable New Value 
(Old Value) 
Variable  
Change  
(%) 
IRR IRR 
change 
(percentage 
points) 
NPV 
(million 
yuan) 
NPV 
change 
(million 
yuan) 
Benefit-
cost ratio 
Administrative 
cost borne by 
authorities 
(million yuan) 
0,9  
(0) 
n.a. 3,0% 
(3,1%) 
 
-0,1 -25,82 
(-24,97) 
-0,85 
 
0,71 
(0,71) 
Administrative 
cost borne by 
developer 
(million yuan) 
0,009 
(0) 
n.a. 3,1% (negligible) -24,97 
 
(negligible) 0,71 
External 
socio-
environmental 
benefits (M 
yuan/year) 
8,69 
(2,10) 
+314% 12,3% +9,2 68,53 +93,5 1,78 
4,21 +100% 6,5% +3,4 4,93 +29,9 1,06 
1,05 -50% 0,9% -2,16 -39,92 -14,95 0,54 
Electricity 
price 
(yuan/kWh) 
610  
(470) 
+30%2 4,2% +1,1 -15,29 +9,68 0,82 
940 +100%3 6,9% +3,8 7,52 +32,49 1,09 
Energy 
savings 
(kWh/m2a) 
20 
(25) 
-20% 1,5% -1,6 -37,44 -12,47 0,57 
40 +60% 7,4% +4,3 12,44 +37,41 1,14 
Discount rate  10% (6%) +66,7% 1,66% -1,10 -50,96 -21,72 0,42 
9% +50% 1,88% -0,88 -47,36 -18,12 0,47 
8% +33,3% 2,13% -0,63 -42,80 -13,56 0,52 
7% +16,7% 2,43% -0,34 -36,93 -7,69 0,59 
5% -16,7% 3,15% +0,38 -18,96 +10,28 0,79 
4% -33,3% 3,59% +0,82 -4,87 +24,37 0,95 
3%  -50% 4,08% +1,32 15,02 +44,26 1,16 
2% -66,7% 4,64% +1,87 44,13 +73,37 1,46 
1% -83,3% 5,26% +2,49 88,45 +117,69 1,92 
0% -100% 5,94% +3,17 158,96 188,20 2,64 
 
3.2.4 Benevolent scenario 
The base case CBA is based on rather conservative estimates. Drawing on the results of the 
sensitivity analysis, it is interesting from a policy-making point of view to examine how the 
negative CBA outcome might be affected by a combination of more favorable, but still not 
unreasonable assumptions for some of the key variables. Such a hypothetical “benevolent 
scenario” may serve as an indication of policy design opportunities. 
Central bank discount rates, including in China, have been kept low lately in order to stimulate 
the market. Thus a 3% discount rate may not be less reasonable than a 6% one. Energy 
                                                
2 An immediate 30% increase corresponds to an annual real price increase of approximately 2% for 40 years. 
3 An immediate 100% increase corresponds to an annual real price increase of almost 5% for 40 years. 
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savings could possibly be 35 rather than 25 kWh/m2a, considering the poor energy efficiency 
standard of business-as-usual construction (the absolute energy consumption figure is less 
important here). And the electricity price for residential mid- and high-income users might rise 
by 30% in not too distant a future.  
Combining these three individually fully feasible assumptions in a “benevolent scenario” 
brings a much more beneficial result: an IRR of 8,72%, an NPV of 84,62 million yuan, and a 
benefit-cost ratio of 1,90. The payback time for society is just above twelve years. Price 
premium is disregarded, i.e. the socio-environmental benefits alone outweigh the costs. 
Table 3-4. Benevolent scenario CBA. Altered input data variables and results. 
Item Value Change compared to base case CBA 
Discount rate 3% -50% 
Electricity price 610 yuan/MWh  +30% 
Energy savings 35 kWh/m2a +40% 
Benefit-cost ratio 1,99 +1,28 
IRR 9,3% +6,2 percentage points 
NPV 89,01 million yuan +113,98 million yuan 
(All other input and assumptions as in table 3.1.) 
 
 
Figure 3-4. Benevolent Scenario CBA, cumulative discounted costs/benefits, Four-High 
Award/Chenghuaxinyuan Green Building measures. Input data, see table 3.4. 
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3.3 Cost-Revenue Analysis  
The Cost-Revenue Analysis points to a very poor deal from the residents’ perspective, 
financially speaking. The internal rate of return for the residents “investment in Green living” 
is -14,6%, and the net present value is -6137,6 yuan/m2. The energy-cost savings of a 
maximum 11,1 yuan/m2a (the first year, thereafter discounted by 6% each year) do in no way 
recoup the residents’ increase in housing price of 6600 yuan/m2 (compared to the average for 
newly built residential buildings at the same time in Shanghai (Y. Liu, 2012, p. 68)), not even 
when assuming a “building lifetime” residency of 40 years. Payback time is “never” from a 
private-economic perspective. 
One possible conclusion is that energy cost savings simply are not an important factor when 
Shanghai real-estate customers make their choices right now.  
Table 3-5 Cost-Revenue Analysis, residents’ incremental investment 
 
Figure 3-5. Cumulative discounted cashflow for residents due to Green Building Measures. 
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Item Value Source/comment 
Price increase attributable 
to G.B. measures 
6600 yuan/m2 (Y. Liu, 2012) 
Annual energy savings 25 kWh/m2 Assumption based on (Connelly, 2012) and (Zhang & 
Zhang, 2013), for explanation see 3.2, paragraph 2. 
Electricity price 0,47 yuan/kWh [Internet search] 
Discount rate 6% Based on Mundaca & Neij (2009) 
Internal rate of return -14,6%  
Net present value -6138 yuan/m2  
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From the developers point of view, on the other hand, the result is quite the contrary. The 
CRA shows an IRR of 2509,5%, and a NPV of 2,061 billion yuan for the Green Building 
measures. The extreme result is due to revenues – increased housing price - being about 26 
times as high as costs. Energy savings are not part of this calculus, as energy costs are paid by 
the residents. 
Table 3-6. Cost-Revenue Analysis, developer’s investment in Green Building measures 
 
Figure 3-6. Cumulative discounted cashflow for the developer due to Green Building Measures. 
 
 
3.3.1 CRA Sensitivity Analysis 
The OTA method was used for the sensitivity analysis of the CRA. As with the CBA, the 
probably most critical variable is the increase in housing price paid by Vanke’s customers due 
to the increase in ecological and energy standard, and its significance for the CRA result, due 
to its uncertainty: it is disputable whether this increase is due to the Green Building measures 
only.  
First the sensitivity analysis for the residents’ investment in a low-energy home. If we assume 
that only half of it is attributable to the Green Building measures (3300 yuan/m2 instead of 
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Item Value Source/comment 
Increased housing price 
revenues 
2,414 billion yuan 
(6600 yuan/m2) 
(Y. Liu, 2012) 
Assuming all apartments are sold year 1. 
Incremental investment 92,5 million yuan (Y. Liu, 2012) 
Discount rate 6% Based on Mundaca & Neij (2009) 
Internal rate of return 2361,8%  
Net present value 1939,6 million yuan  
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6600), then the net present value of the residents’ “investment” in Green living is still 
negative, but the loss is nearly cut in half. Reducing the Green Building related price increase 
to a sixth reduces the loss almost proportionally. The internal rate of return is less affected, 
but not insignificantly. 
Another uncertain variable is the amount of annual energy savings, as it is an assumption 
based on low quality data. Yet its influence on the result appears to be limited. Assuming 50% 
bigger savings affects NPV and IRR rather insignificantly. Not even a 100% increase of the 
energy savings – not very likely - makes any substantial difference to the NPV- it rises by 88,3 
yuan/m2 only – while the IRR is somewhat more affected. 
Naturally, the same relative changes to the other variable in the energy-cost savings equation, 
the electricity price, affect the result in exactly the same way. A doubling of electricity price 
yields the same IRR and NPV as a doubling of the energy savings. In other words, the two 
factors are equally (in)significant for the outcome, perhaps with the reservation that a future 
higher electricity price is much more likely than the energy savings being much bigger than 
assumed. 
Reducing the discount rate by 50%, from 6% to 3%, actually affects the IRR more than a 
halving of the G.B. related incremental housing cost does, raising it by 2,5 percentage points 
to -12,1%. However the net present value is far less affected, rising merely 28,3 yuan/m2 to 
negative 6093,2 yuan/m2. 
Conclusively, the incremental housing cost is the totally dominating factor for the outcome of 
the CRA. Hence the question of the reliability of the results becomes a question of 
interpretation. There is little uncertainty about the price increase amount as such, the question 
remains how much of it is due to the Green Building measures. A different appraisal of this 
changes the outcome greatly. However the price increase is so large compared to energy cost 
savings that not even an 83% discount would make it pay off financially for the residents. 
Table 3-7. Sensitivity Analysis, CRA, residents’ contribution 
Variable New Value 
(Old Value) 
Item  
Change  
(%) 
IRR IRR 
change 
(percentage 
points) 
NPV 
(yuan/m2) 
NPV 
change 
(yuan/m2) 
Price 
increase 
attributable 
to G.B. 
measures 
(yuan/m2) 
3300 
(6600) 
-50% -12,7% 
(-14,6%) 
+1,9  -3123,2  
(6137) 
+3014,4  
 
1100  -83% -9,1% +5,5  -923,2  +5214,4 
Annual 
energy 
savings 
(kWh/m2a) 
37,5  
(25) 
+50% -13,5% +1,1 -6093,2 +44,4 
50  +100% -12,7% +1,9 -6048,7 +88,3 
Electricity 
price 
0,61 yuan/kWh 
(0,47 yuan/kWh) 
+30% -13,9% +0,7 -6110,9 +26,1 
0,94 yuan/kWh +100% -12,7% +1,9 -6048,7 +88,3 
Discount 
rate (%) 
3% (6%) -50% -12,1% +2,5 -6109,3 +28,3 
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For the developer, a change in the increased housing-price-related revenues does have 
significant, almost proportional, impact on the result. Thus the uncertainty about its 
attributability to Green Building measures is a source of uncertainty for the CRA as a whole, 
just as with the CRA from residents’ point of view. From a business point of view, on the 
other hand, even when cutting the incremental revenue by five sixths to 410,4 million yuan, 
the IRR is still an extraordinary 318,5% and the NPV a reassuring 257,3 million yuan. 
For the incremental investment cost, a higher value is unlikely, since the project is finished and 
the data source is ex-post. However, if increasing it by 25% anyway, the effect on the IRR is 
almost reversely proportional, reducing it by about a fifth. The effect on the NPV is very 
slight. The same is true when assuming a 50% lower incremental investment, a less unlikely 
assumption in the sense that the entire incremental investment may actually not be due to the 
Green Building measures only. 
Variations in the discount rate has very little effect on the result since it is only used once, on 
the one time revenue post incurred in year 1. 
Table 3-8. Sensitivity Analysis, CRA, developer’s investment in Green Building measures 
Variable New Value 
(Old Value) 
Item  
Change 
(%) 
IRR IRR 
change 
(percentage 
points) 
NPV 
(million 
yuan) 
NPV 
change 
(million 
yuan) 
Increased 
revenues 
(million 
yuan) 
1207,0  
(2414,0) 
-50% 1130,9% 
(2361,8%) 
-1230 926,1 
(1939,6) 
-1013,5 
410,4  -83% 318,5% -2043,3 257,3 -1682,3 
Incremental 
investment 
(million 
yuan) 
115,6  
(92,5) 
+25% 1870,1% -491,7 1917,8 -21,8 
46,3 -50% 4818,8% +2457,0 1983,2 +43,6 
Discount 
rate (%) 
3% (6%) -50% 2433,8% +72,0 1998,7 +59,0 
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4 Discussion 
This chapter discusses the findings, their meaning and credibility, their implications for the 
research problem, the assumptions and the data sources behind them, and the conditions of 
the research and analysis as such. 
4.1 Price premium and incremental cost 
A “neutral” CBA, i.e. one that disregards the price premium paid by customers because it is an 
internal transaction within society, yields a clearly negative result, pointing to the policy as 
being inefficient. 
All in all, however, this appears to be something of a pseudo-problem. The CBA conveys a 
loss to society, but this is an illusion: in reality no one really loses. Society gets socio-
environmental benefits that by far outweigh the government’s own expenses, the developer 
gets great return on investment, and the customers get the sustainable, high-status living that 
they are willing to pay for. Since customers are willing to pay the price premium, developers 
have an incentive to produce Green Buildings, which in turn does generate socio-
environmental benefits to society. The fact that costs are bigger than socio-environmental 
benefits is less important as long as they are covered by the price premium paid by customers. 
A “neutral” CBA that disregards the price premium is misleading in that it compares the costs 
carried by two parties – public society (including government) and companies – to the benefits 
enjoyed by only one of the parties – public society. It considers companies’ costs but leaves 
out the benefits that are the companies’ main reason for investment: the price premium. If the 
price premium is considered a benefit instead of being left out or treated as a cost, then the 
CBA outcome is extremely beneficial. 
Then again, the price premium cannot really be treated as a benefit to society either, because 
of the residents, who are also part of society and to whom it is clearly a cost and not a benefit.  
There is no unequivocal explanation to the price premium. There are a number of factors for 
which at least a certain market segment of customers are willing to pay more. Part of the price 
premium represents a value added by the Green Building measures, which in today’s China are 
becoming a status factor among some groups. Other status qualities of the buildings, their 
architecture and location, which do not have anything to do with the Green Building 
measures, are another driver. Finally the expectations on continued price increases play a 
major role on the real-estate market, in China more than in most other places, and can be 
assumed to add substantially to the price premium for an above-average housing scheme like 
Chenghuaxinyuan. Hence the most radical assumption in the sensitivity analysis of the CRA 
for residents and developer respectively, about only 17% of the price premium being 
attributable to Green Building measures (item change -83%), may very well be the closest to 
the truth.  
Bearing this dilemma in mind, the CBA is still useful in that it illustrates the relationships 
between government costs, developers’ costs, socio-environmental benefits, price premium, 
and economic efficiency. As demonstrated by the Benevolent Scenario, it also points to policy 
design options that might enable socio-environmental benefits to outweigh costs by 
themselves, with or without price premium. 
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4.2 Green Building policies and project realisation 
For the developer the increase in rent revenues by far recoups the cost of going 3-star Green 
Building, as indicated by the CRA. The incremental cost for Green Building achievements is 
passed on to the residents many times over. The fact that this is feasible reflects the branding 
value of Green Building to companies and the emerging status of sustainable living in China. 
The interview findings indicate a weak causality in general between Chinese financial policy 
incentives and Green Building project realisation. This raises the question of whether it is even 
meaningful to talk of economic efficiency: if the same energy savings would have occurred 
without any public spending, or with twice the current public spending, what’s the efficiency?  
In the particular case of Chenghuaxinyuan and the Four High award, the causality between the 
reward and the choice to go for Green Building standard can also be questioned, as that 
choice had already made when the project was rewarded. However, interview findings indicate 
that there is considerable negotiation between developers and local government for every 
major building scheme, where the issue of Green Building is being pushed by government, 
thus it cannot be ruled out that the Award has played a part as an incentive in this process, be 
it financial or brand-related. 
Most of all, financial incentives such as the Four-High Award are granted as a reward and a 
sign of government’s approval of a company’s environmental conduct. It should be viewed in 
a wider context than just the bilateral relationship between the government and the single 
developer: it is a signal to the market as a whole, an indication of the government’s intention. 
As such, it functions as an informative policy instrument as much as a market-based one. And 
the government’s intention, in turn, is a strong driver for all developers. Seen this way, the 
Award might in fact be very cost-efficient, as a way to influence all developers by rewarding 
one. Analysing its economic efficiency from this perspective would require a more complex 
model than the simple CBA used in this paper. 
4.3 Uncertainty: data and results 
The study has generally been suffering from data quality problems. Since none of the 
authorities or developers that were contacted replied, no first-hand figures on Green Building 
projects, subsidies received or energy savings achieved could be obtained. The data on 
Chenghuaxinyuan retrieved from the MSc. thesis of Liu (2012) has been hard to verify, 
although some of it is supported by the presentations of the scheme that were found. On the 
other hand it is properly referenced and does not contain any particular outliers that would 
give grounds for questioning its credibility. 
The assumption of 25% energy savings compared to contemporary business-as-usual 
residential construction is a difficult one. The general standard of living is rising tremendously, 
thus so is the total energy consumption. People are going from very low energy living to high 
energy living, and so it is hard to establish a baseline against which to measure savings. This is 
one of the key task currently engaging the Tongji Architectural Design Institute as well as the 
Shanghai Green Building Council: trying to establish a new acceptable baseline against which 
energy savings can be measured (Xueya, 2013). 
Another problematic piece of data is the economic benefit of avoided socio-environmental 
externalities. The outcome of the CBA changes completely depending on which figure is used, 
as the sensitivity analysis shows. Greenpeace is an environmental organisation, not a university 
or research institute, and it publishes its own reports, which reduces the reliability of data. On 
the other hand, the figures of Hirschberg et al. (2004) on the effects of coal power production 
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in the Shandong province in 1998 are 15 years old. The most reasonable assumption appears 
to be that Greenpeace’s figures are acceptably reliable, and if biased then biased towards 
overstating external cost, which in that case further reinforces the conclusion that the Green 
Building measures taken in the Chenghuaxinyuan project are not beneficial enough from a 
societal point of view, and thus that the Four-High Award promoting them is an economically 
inefficient market-based policy instrument under current conditions. Then again, as also 
shown in the sensitivity analysis, this could change with a sharp rise in electricity price, which 
is not too unlikely an event (“Smart Grid Insights by Zpryme,” 2012). 
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5 Conclusions, recommendations and further research 
5.1 Conclusions 
The economic efficiency of the Four High Community Award as a market-based policy 
instrument for Green Buildings in Shanghai, applied on the Chenghuaxinyuan housing 
scheme, is low. The benefit-cost ratio is 0,71, i.e. clearly unbeneficial, the internal rate of 
return is 3,1%, i.e. below any normal investment return target, and the net present value is -
24,97 million yuan, i.e. a clearly negative result. If increased housing price is included as a cost 
the results are many times worse. See table 3.2.  
The main reason for this is that the energy-related cost savings and avoided socio-
environmental externalities considered in the study (i.e. in the specific housing project) are too 
small compared to the developer’s incremental investment cost. This in turn depends firstly 
on the electricity price being too low, secondly on energy-saving measures not being far-
reaching enough - the building envelope in Chenghuaxinyuan could still not be considered a 
low-energy construction by European standards – and thirdly on the system boundaries of the 
study. The Benevolent Scenario CBA indicates that a combination of somewhat bigger energy 
savings than assumed in the base case, combined with a 30% rise in electricity price, would 
improve economic efficiency tangibly, especially if a lower discount rate is used. 
However, while socio-environmental benefits cannot yet pay for the incremental project costs 
of Green Building, some customers can. This explains why the project was realised, and why it 
is in fact benefial to society as well as developer: the residents pay many times over for the 
developer’s incremental investment, which in turn generates socio-environmental benefits to 
society.  
Also, if the impact of the Award on the market as a whole were to be considered, the outcome 
might be quite different. Serving as a signal of the government’s intentions and a financial 
incentive for improvement, adressing all developers at the same time but only paying one per 
year, the Award possibly contributes to energy savings and emissions reductions in many 
projects, not just Chenghuaxinyuan. The economic efficiency of the policy instrument is then 
potentially much higher. A more extensive and complex CBA might determine this. 
The net benefits to the residents of paying the extra price of a greener living by buying a home 
in Chenghuaxinyuan are none from a purely economic point of view: in fact they are negative. 
The cost-revenue analysis points to a loss of 6137,6 yuan per square meter and an internal rate 
of return of -14,6%. This in turn points to other considerations being more important than 
the strictly economic ones for the market segment targeted by the developer for this type of 
housing schemes, such as status and environmental concerns. 
To the developer the net benefits of the extra investment resulting in a CGBL 3-star-rated 
houing scheme are tremendous. If the entire price premium related increase in revenues is 
attributed to it, the CRA points to a fantastic return on investment: a top net present value of 
1939,6 million yuan and an internal rate of return of 2361,8%. Attributing a smaller portion of 
the price premium to the Green Building measures still leaves the with very large net benefits. 
Interview findings indicate that fiscal policy incentives such as subsidies and awards are less 
important factors when Chinese real-estate developers consider Green Building. The desire 
and need for good relations to local government appears to be much more important. Hence, 
as stated above, the Four-High Award may be functioning as an informative instrument, 
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conveying government intentions, as much as a fiscal one. Another major driver is branding 
regards: major developers want to claim leadership in Sustainable Architecture to the market. 
5.2 Policy recommendations 
The finding that increased energy savings might have achieved socio-economic feasibility in 
the case of Chenghuaxinyuan points to the possibility that tougher specific energy-saving 
requirements might enhance the economic efficiency of market-based Green Building policy 
instruments.  
For example, if the Four-High energy award were conditional upon a maximum energy use of 
30 or 25 kWh/m2a, it might spur a race towards energy-efficient construction comparable to 
that in Europe. Given the generally much lower cost of construction in China (Zhang & 
Zhang, 2013), this should not be impossible. 
Judging by the CBA, the economic efficiency of Green Building policies would be further 
improved if the suggested energy requirements were combined with raised electricity prices  
(see section 3.2.4, Benevolent Scenario), or a tax on fossil-fuel produced electricity coupled 
with a subsidy on renewable. In fact such a policy is already underway and to be introduced on 
September 25 2013 for some sectors, albeit not for residential housing (“China.org.cn,” 2013). 
The practice of basing energy efficiency requirements and standards on comparison to a 
baseline energy consumption, as is being done in the “Mandatory minimum design energy 
saving rate for newly-built buildings” regulation as well as in CGBL, is complicated, especially 
in a country where standards of living is changing so fast. The question of what is a reasonable 
baseline is currently putting some of the country’s best experts to work. Why demand the 
extra calculation work of comparing with obsolete construction techniques? It would appear 
more practical and straightforward to set absolute requirements instead of relative ones, 
prescribing an actual maximum level of energy consumption for maintaining a given indoor 
temperature in each building category, as is the practice in most European countries. These 
levels - or the temperatures or both – might then be adjusted with the progress of 
development. 
Today’s Chinese construction regulation documents, design standards and guidelines are 
lengthy and complicated. A simplification would probably save time and money and enhance 
the penetration power of Green Building policies. 
Finally, it is concluded that more transparency and better accessibility to authorities’ and 
institutions’ data and officials would strongly benefit research, development and Green 
Building progress in China.  
5.3 Further research 
The research questions of this study could well be investigated again just as they are and 
applying the same basic CBA and CRA methodology, given access to better data, preferrably 
first-hand information, on one or more housing schemes. Establishing good communication 
with “insider” stakeholders such as real-estate developers and housing, environment and 
energy authorities is a prerequisite for a more reliable result. 
Better and more detailed data would also allow the use of finer analysis tools. For example, 
with detailed information on building service systems and their performance etc., the RET 
Screen software, issued by the Canadian government, could be used to conduct an investment 
risk analysis to complement the findings with another perspective. 
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As soon as the national and municipal subsidies for CGBL 2- and 3-Star rated buildings have 
been disbursed for some time, a similar study could be performed on their economic 
efficiency, to investigate the relationship between amount of support given and amount of 
energy saved, and any other patterns in their use and impact. 
The economic efficiency of policy instruments such as the Four-High Award and the National 
Green Building Innovation Award could also be studied in a wider perspective, investigating 
and attempting to quantify its influence on Green Building practices on the market in general. 
If awards do in fact spur Green Building project decisions across the market, then the energy 
savings achieved there might be estimated and compared to costs, which might result in a very 
different conclusion regarding economic efficiency than the one in this study. 
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Appendix I – Questionnaire 
 
Energy efficiency measures and financial incentives in building projects 
For the MSc. Thesis 
“The Economic Efficiency Of Market-Based Green Building Policy Instruments In China”  
by Albert Orrling, architect, MSc. candidate, Environmental Management and Policy. 
International Institute of Industrial Environmental Economics, Lund, Sweden, www.iiiee.lu.se 
 
1. General data on specific project  
 
1.1 Name of the project: 
 
1.2 Developer, owner: 
 
1.3 Architect: 
 
1.4 Contractor: 
 
1.5 Type of project (retrofit/new construction, residential/commercial/public): 
 
1.6 Project size (m2): 
 
1.7 Total investment cost: 
 
1.8 Project start date: 
 
1.9 Project completion date: 
1.10 General description / other relevant information on the project: 
 
2. Energy properties of the project 
 
2.1 What is the (estimated) energy demand of the building(s)? (kWh/m2a) 
2.2 What heating and cooling technologies are applied in the project? 
2.3 What are the power sources/fuels of those heating and cooling systems? 
2.4 Approximate price of these energy sources/fuels in Shanghai today?  
2.5 Environmental/energy rating or certification of the project (China Green Building Label/3Star, 
LEED, etc.) 
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3. Energy - incentives and measures: 
 
3.1 Are any public financial energy efficiency incentives being applied in the project?  
 
3.2 If so, which ones? 
 
3.3 What energy savings measures are realized in the project due/related to these incentives? (extra      
      insulation, better windows, HRV, heat pumps, district cooling, etc.)  
 
3.4 Amount of financial support for each type of energy efficiency measure? 
 
3.5 How much energy is (estimated to be) saved thanks to each (type of) measure? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Information on responding company 
 
1.1 Name: 
 
1.2 Established year: 
 
1.3 Based in (city): 
 
1.4 Operating in (cities, countries): 
 
1.5 Business focus area (residential/commercial/public, retrofit/new construction/other):  
 
1.6 Main business model (contractor / build and sell / build, own and let / other): 
 
1.7 Number of employees: 
 
1.8 Turnover: 
 
1.9 Other relevant information: 
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Appendix II – CBA method  
For the Cost-Benefit Analysis on MBIs, an Excel-based calculation tool was employed which 
was developed by Luis Mundaca and used in a study of the economic efficiency of Tradable 
White Certificates (an energy efficiency trading scheme) in the UK (Mundaca & Neij, 2009). 
The tool calculates the economic efficiency of a policy programme comprising a bundle of 
energy saving measures, that adress various domestic uses of heat and electricity for space 
and water heating, lighting and appliances. From input data on annual energy savings per 
measure unit, number of units, measure lifetime and discount rate, the total annual energy 
savings per measure are calculated and discounted, yielding a series of slowly diminishing 
annual energy savings. These are multiplied with the price (user input, assumption) of the 
energy type in question for the specific measure, yielding an annual financial saving per 
measure.  
The financial savings of all measures are added together for each year, yielding the total 
energy costs savings achieved by the policy programme in that specific year. The monetized 
value of total avoided socioenvironmental external costs is calculated by multiplying energy 
savings with assumed socioenvironmental external cost per energy unit consumed (user 
input), yielding the Net Benefit of the programme for each year.  
The cost of the policy programme is calculated as an initial, one-time expense, comprising 
the sum of the investment costs of the obliged parties of the programme with added 
transaction and administrative costs, investment costs for other entities, customer investment 
cost, and the administrative costs for the policymaking authority itself. Investment costs are 
entered as input by the user, as is the authority's administrative cost, while obliged parties' 
transaction and administrative costs are calculated as percentages of their investment costs. 
The result is the Total Cost of the policy programme. 
The total cost is inserted as the first in a series of annual payments, the following payments 
being the net benefit (of energy savings) of each subsequent year. From this payments series, 
the economic efficiency of the programme, as internal rate of return, net present value and 
benefit-cost ratio, is calculated by standard formulae, in the latter two cases using a discount 
rate set by the user. 
The tool also calculates the cumulative cashflow and the cumulative discounted costs and 
benefits of the programme, using the same series of annual payments. 
 
